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Abstract
The tomahawk bifurcation is used by Fujita et al. (1999) in a model with
two regions to explain the formation of a core-periphery urban pattern from
an initial uniform distribution. Baldwin et al. (2003) show that the tomahawk
bifurcation disappears when the two regions have an uneven population of im-
mobile agricultural workers. Thus, the appearance of this type of bifurcation is
the result of assumed exogenous model symmetry. We provide a general analy-
sis in a regional model of the class of bifurcations that have crossing equilibrium
loci, including the tomahawk bifurcation, by examining arbitrary smooth pa-
rameter paths in a higher dimensional parameter space. We nd that, in a
parameter space satisfying a mild rank condition, generically in all parameter
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paths this class of bifurcations does not appear. In other words, conclusions
drawn from the use of this bifurcation to generate a core-periphery pattern are
not robust. Generically, this class of bifurcations is a myth, an urban legend.
Keywords and Phrases: Bifurcation; genericity analysis; migration dy-
namics
JEL Classication Numbers: C61, R23, F12
1. Introduction
Economic activities are not distributed uniformly in space. Manufacturing often
concentrates in a few regions, resulting in a core-periphery pattern. How does one
region come to dominate others and become a manufacturing core? The literature
often considers a two region system. Beginning with a uniform distribution of immo-
bile agricultural workers or farmers, Fujita et al. (1999) explain the emergence of the
core-periphery urban pattern using the dynamics of a tomahawk bifurcation when
transportation cost varies and other parameters are xed (see also Fujita and Mori,
1997). When transportation cost is high, the symmetric equilibrium, where both re-
gions have the same mobile manufacturing population, is the only equilibrium and it
is stable. When transportation cost is moderate, two other stable equilibria emerge;
when this happens, one of the two regions attracts all of the manufacturing, resulting
in a core-periphery pattern. When transportation cost is low, the symmetric equi-
librium becomes unstable and the only stable equilibria are the two core-periphery
equilibria.
Is this type of bifurcation robust? Baldwin et al. (2003) examine the case where
one region has slightly more immobile agricultural workers than the other. The model
still preserves the feature of catastrophic agglomeration but the tomahawk bifurca-
tion disappears. This means that the tomahawk bifurcation results from exogenous
model symmetry. In addition, they show that, in the footloose entrepreneur model,
the tomahawk bifurcation appears in the case of symmetric immobile population in
regions but disappears with asymmetric populations (see also Forslid and Ottaviano,
2003).
To illustrate how the underlying exogenous parameters, such as the location of
immobile population, a¤ect bifurcation patterns, lets consider the following one-
2
dimensional dynamical system with two parameters:
_x = a+ bx  x3
where x 2 < and parameters (a; b) 2 <2. This system exhibits the standard pitchfork
bifurcation when a = 0 (see Figure 1; the solid and dashed lines indicate stable
and unstable equilibria respectively). To show that this bifurcation is not robust,
we perturb a to 0:005 and obtain Figure 2 instead. The general contour is still the
same and the stable and unstable regions change slightly, but the equilibrium loci do
not cross each other. This is a saddle-node bifurcation. The same pattern appears
when we perturb a to  0:005 in Figure 3. The full equilibrium diagram against
the two-dimensional parameter space (a; b) is plotted in Figure 4. Consider all one
dimensional paths in (a; b) space and the equilibrium diagram generated by taking a
slice of the three-dimensional picture along any path. We can see that only in some
paths passing through (0; 0), there is a pitchfork bifurcation.
[Figure 1 Here]
[Figure 2 Here]
[Figure 3 Here]
[Figure 4 Here]
This paper provides a general analysis of the class of bifurcations having cross-
ing equilibrium loci in a two region model. This class includes, for example, the
tomahawk, the pitchfork, and the transcritical bifurcations. It is well-known that
such bifurcations are not stable: all bifurcations of one-parameter families at an
equilibrium with a zero eigenvalue can be perturbed into saddle-node bifurcations
(Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1997, p. 149). Baldwin et al. (2003) demonstrate ex-
actly this by adding a slight population asymmetry while letting the dynamical system
change along the transportation cost axis. We examine equilibrium dynamics along
arbitrary smooth (Cr) parameter paths in a higher dimensional parameter space. We
show that in a parameter space satisfying a mild rank condition, generically1 in all
parameter paths this class of bifurcations does not appear. Thus, these kinds of
1Here, a generic property means a property satised by parameter paths in an open and dense
set.
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bifurcations are not robust, and their appearance relies on the strategic choice of
very specic parameter values. The rank condition just mentioned requires that the
Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system with respect to endogenous variables and
parameters has full rank at every equilibrium for all parameter values, and is standard
in the general equilibrium literature on smooth economies. We show that it is easy
to nd such a parameter space.
Section 2 introduces the benchmark model and extends it to more exogenous
parameters. Section 3 discusses migration dynamics and presents the main result.
Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
The core-periphery model features a two-region economy with the same resources
in both regions. The same populations of immobile farmers in both regions produce
a homogeneous agricultural good under constant returns to scale. A population of
mobile manufacturing workers can migrate between regions. These manufacturing
workers move to the region where they enjoy a higher utility level. The transporta-
tion of manufactured goods across regions bears a cost while transport of the agri-
cultural good does not. Manufacturing rms produce di¤erentiated products under
increasing returns to scale technologies, competing monopolistically. There are two
types of pecuniary externalities that generate forces causing agglomeration. These
forces imply positive feedback that comes from rms locating near each other. First,
manufacturing production will concentrate where there is a large market with many
workers consuming manufactured goods. Second, workers will move to the region
where production concentrates because the manufactured goods are cheaper there.
The benchmark model is introduced formally next. We then expand the model by
adding three more exogenous parameters to conduct genericity analysis in a higher
dimensional parameter space.
The Benchmark Model
There are two regions in the economy indexed by i 2 f1; 2g. There are two
types of commodities: a homogeneous agricultural good and horizontally di¤eren-
tiated manufactured goods. There is a continuum of manufactured goods of size
n 2 <+, determined endogenously. Each manufactured good is denoted by j 2 [0; n].
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Let pAi 2 <++ denote the local price of the agricultural good, and let pi (j), where
pi : [0; n] ! <++ is a measurable function, denote the local price of each manufac-
tured good j in region i. There are two types of consumers: immobile farmers of
population LAi in region i 2 f1; 2g, and mobile workers of total population LM who
migrate between regions. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor, supplied
inelastically.
Let A 2 <+ denote the quantity of the agricultural good, and let m (j), where
m : [0; n]! <+ is a measurable function, denote the quantity of manufactured good
j. All consumers have the same utility function
u (m;A) =MA1 ;
where M =
R n
0
m (j) dj
 1
 and 0 < ;  < 1. A consumer in region i with income Y
solves the following problem.
Max
A;m(j)2<+
u (m;A) ;
s:t: pAi A+
R n
0
pi (j)m (j) dj = Y:
(1)
The demand functions are
A^i (Y ) = (1  )Y=pAi ;
m^i (j; Y ) = Y G

1 
i =pi (j)
1
1  ;
where Gi =
hR n
0
pi (j)

 1 dj
i  1

is the manufacturing price index.
There are two types of workers, skilled workers who work in the manufacturing
sector and unskilled workers or farmers who work in the agricultural sector. Skilled
workers can move between regions, whereas unskilled workers cannot move between
regions. Neither type of worker can change type to move to the other sector. Each
worker is also a consumer, and supplies one unit of labor inelastically to the sector in
which they are employed.
The agricultural good is produced by farmers with a one-to-one (labor input)-
output ratio. For simplicity, the transportation of the agricultural good is assumed
to bear no cost. Thus, the equilibrium agricultural commodity price is the same in
both regions by no arbitrage; let pA1 = p
A
2 = p
A. Farmers retain all the revenue and
they have income pA.
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Manufactured goods are produced by rms that employ mobile workers. Labor is
the only input required. All rms have the same inverse production function
l = F + cq;
where F; c > 0 are the xed and the marginal input requirements in terms of labor,
whereas l units of labor are required for q units of output. The production technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale due to xed costs. There is free entry into the
market that is subject to the xed cost. Because of increasing returns to scale, each
j-good is produced by and is the only product of an operating rm. Operating rms
choose locations and engage in Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Each rm
chooses a location and charges a uniform free-on-board price for its product. Firms
make decisions simultaneously. Let wi 2 <++ denote the wage rate in region i.
Suppose a rm locates in region i, charges price p, pays wage wi, and sells output
q (p), where q : <++ ! < is the demand of consumers. Its prot is
i (p) = pq (p)  wi [F + cq (p)] :
A rm in region i solves the following problem.
Max
p2<++
i (p) : (2)
It is well-known that because of the assumed constant elasticity utility function and
the iceberg transportation cost (to be dened shortly), the elasticity of demand faced
by a rm is independent of the locations of its consumers. A monopolistically compet-
itive rm charges a price marked up from the marginal cost. The prot-maximizing
price for a rm in region i is pi = cwi=. Its maximized prot is
i =
1  

cwi

q   F
(1  ) c

:
The transportation cost of manufactured goods takes the Samuelson iceberg form.
If one unit of good is shipped across regions, the fraction 1=T of the unit arrives
(T > 1). Since rms are identical and their behavior di¤ers only in location, we
label rms and their products with their locations. This simplies the notation to
j 2 f1; 2g. We replace pi (j) with pji , which denotes the price of region j products in
region i, and replace m^i (j; Y ) with m^
j
i (Y ), which denotes the demand for region j
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products by region i consumers (with prices an implicit argument). We denote the
utility function by u (m1i ;m
2
i ; Ai), replacing the function m with scalars m
1
i and m
2
i
representing the quantity of manufactured goods consumed by a region i worker, and
letting Ai represent the agricultural commodity consumption of a region i worker.
Let m1Ai, m
1
Ai
, and AAi denote the analogous quantities for region i farmers. The
superscript denotes the region in which commodities are produced. Let ni denote the
number of rms in region i. The total number of operating rms equals the total
variety of products; n1 + n2 = n. Note that Gi =
h
n1 (p
1
i )

 1 + n2 (p
2
i )

 1
i  1

.
A region i rm charges a free-on-board price pi = cwi=. Thus, pii = pi and
pji = pjT for j 6= i by no arbitrage. Substituting Y with wi, we have region i
manufacturing workersindirect utility:
vi = 
 (1  )1 wiG i for i 2 f1; 2g :
Manufacturing workers are freely mobile. They choose a region that o¤ers the highest
utility level.
Extended Parameters
Above is the standard model of the new economic geography. The model is usually
studied with varying transportation cost. In order to facilitate analysis in a higher
dimension, we augment the system with three more exogenous parameters. These
parameters do not change the model signicantly, but they do accommodate asym-
metric parameterizations. Let  be an open subset of <3; its elements are denoted by
 = (1; 2; ), where i 2 ( F;1) (for i = 1; 2) and  2 ( 1; 1). These parameters
enter the model in the following way:
(i) i parameterizes regional xed inputs: The xed labor input of a region i
rm is F + i. Note that although rmsprot function is changed to
i (p) = pq (p)  wi [F + i + cq (p)] ;
their chosen price cwi= is not a¤ected.
(ii)  parameterizes regional amenity: Workers have preferences over regions as
follows. If a worker lives in region 2, her utility function is unchanged. If she lives in
region 1, her utility is factored up by (1 + ). The new utility function of region 1
workers is
(1 + )u
 
m11;m
2
1; A1

:
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This captures regional di¤erences such as the weather and the landscape. Note that
region 1 workersindirect utility is changed to
v1 = 
 (1  )1  (1 + )w1G 1 :
An economy is specied by a vector of exogenous parameters  2 . The standard
model is parameterized at  = (0; 0; 0). The basic structure of the extended model
and its equilibrium remain the same as those of the standard model, but there are
many other interesting ways to extend the standard model to more parameters; we
view this set of extended parameters as a natural example.
Equilibrium
To facilitate the analysis, we present the denition of equilibrium in a general
equilibrium format. Let LMi denote the worker population in region i, and let Ai,
(m1i ;m
2
i ) denote the consumption of agricultural and manufactured goods, respec-
tively, in region i. Let AAi, m1Ai, m
2
Ai denote the consumption of farmers in region
i. Let qi denote the output level of each region i rm. An allocation in the economy
is described by the following list of variables:
n
LMi ; Ai; AAi;

mji ;m
j
Ai
	2
j=1
; ni; q
i
o2
i=1
.
A feasible allocation satises the following constraints:
LM1 + L
M
2 = L
M : (3)
LM1 m
1
1 + L
A
1m
1
A1 + L
M
2 m
1
2T + L
A
2m
1
A2T   q1 = 0: (4)
LM1 m
2
1T + L
A
1m
2
A1T + L
M
2 m
2
2 + L
A
2m
2
A2   q2 = 0: (5)
LM1 A1 + L
A
1AA1 + L
M
2 A2 + L
A
2AA2   LA = 0: (6)
Equation (3) balances the total manufacturing worker population, each providing
one unit of labor inelastically, and the total labor used. Equations (4) and (5) balance
the consumption of each manufactured good and the amount produced. Equation (6)
balances consumption of agricultural commodity and the amount produced.
Facing prices pA, p1, p2, w1, and w2, the following conditions are satised in
equilibrium. (Note that we have already imposed no-arbitrage on the transportation
of goods.) The entry of new rms drives the prot of operating rms down to zero.
1 = 

2 = 0: (7)
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Workers in the manufacturing sector are identical and freely mobile; they migrate
to the region with a higher utility level. Let  = LM1 =L
M denote region 1s share
of manufacturing worker population. In equilibrium, manufacturing workersutility
levels must be the same in both regions if there are manufacturing workers in both
regions. Thus, the migration equilibrium condition is
v1 = v2, if 0 <  < 1: (8)
Note that manufacturing workersutility vi is not dened if there are no manufac-
turing workers in region i. For completeness, we dene the potential manufacturing
wage of a region as the limit of the equilibrium manufacturing wage when worker
population approaches zero. Then, the potential utility is derived accordingly. Hav-
ing all manufacturing workers in one region constitutes a (boundary) equilibrium if
the potential utility in the other region is not higher. However, since the crossing
part of the bifurcation is interior, we focus on  2 (0; 1).
An equilibrium consists of a list of prices and a feasible allocation such that con-
ditions (1), (2), (7), and (8) are satised. We simplify the system as follows. First,
by (1), the demand by workers in region i for the agricultural good and manufac-
tured goods are Ai = (1  )wi=pA and mji = wiG

1 
i
 
pji
  1
1  , respectively, and the
demand by farmers in region i for the two types of goods are AAi = (1  ) and
mjAi = p
AG

1 
i =
 
pji
 1
1  . By (2), pi = cwi=. Then by (7),
qi =
 (F + 1)
c (1  ) ;
ni =
LMi
(F + i) + c
(F+i)
c(1 )
=
LMi (1  )
F + i
:
Plugging the results above into equations (4) and (5), we have
LMw1G

1 
1
cw1

 1
1 
+
LA1 p
AG

1 
1
cw1

 1
1 
+
(1  )LMw2G

1 
2 T
cw1

T
 1
1 
+
LA2 p
AG

1 
2 T
cw1

T
 1
1 
  (F + 1)
c (1  ) = 0;
(9)
LMw1G

1 
1 T
cw2

T
 1
1 
+
LA1 p
AG

1 
1 T
cw2

T
 1
1 
+
(1  )LMw2G

1 
2
cw2

 1
1 
+
LA2 p
AG

1 
2
cw2

 1
1 
  (F + 2)
c (1  ) = 0;
(10)
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Equation (8) can be replaced with
(1 + )w1G
 
1   w2G 2 = 0: (11)
Finally, normalizing the agricultural price to pA = 1, we have a system of three
variables and three equations. The three equations are the last three above, and
the three variables are w1, w2, and . Let w = (w1; w2) and let f1, f2, g denote
the left-hand side functions of (9), (10), and (11), respectively. Let F (w1; w2; ; ) =
(f1; f2; g), F : <3++! <3. We will focus on the parameter space ; F (w; ; ) = 0
denes the reduced form static equilibrium concept for a parameterized economy.
Since the focus is on migration dynamics, the adjustment of market prices is
assumed to take no time. Once all workers choose a region to live in, commodity
markets reach an equilibrium instantaneously given the population distribution. For
xed parameters, let w (; ) denote the equilibrium price under population , which
is derived from ffi (w; ; ) = 0gi=1;2. In Proposition 1, we will show that this solution
is unique. With this structure, the migration balance condition (11), after solving for
w (; ) but with  as the remaining endogenous variable, is
g (w (; ) ; ; ) = 0:
Note that F (w; ; ) = 0 if and only if g (w (; ) ; ; ) = 0. Let f = (f1; f2). This
approach is valid if there exists a unique solution w (; ) to ffi (w; ; ) = 0gi=1;2 for
any xed  and any xed admissible parameters  2 . We use the following su¢ cient
condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium: the system f (w; ; ) satises
the index condition if j Dwf (w; ; )j > 0 at every equilibrium for all  2 (0; 1)
and for all  2  (as in Mas-Colell, 1995, Denition 17.D.2). This index condition
implies that the equilibrium of F (w; ; ) = 0 is unique by the Index Theorem (see
Mas-Colell, 1995; and Kehoe, 1998).
To explain further, the index condition is a standard condition from the smooth
economies literature that implies existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In simple
terms, it uses the mathematical theory for an index of a xed point to force uniqueness
of equilibrium. For example, in the classical exchange economy with two commodi-
ties, the condition tells us that the slope of the derivative of aggregate excess demand
has the same sign at all equilibria, namely whenever aggregate excess demand is zero,
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so by continuity aggregate excess demand crosses zero at most once. Existence of
equilibrium also follows from the index theorem.
Proposition 1. f (w; ; ) satises the index condition j Dwf (w; ; )j > 0.
Proof.
@f1
@w1
=

c

  1
1 
(w1)
 2+
1  B1 +

cw1

  1
1 
LMG

1 
1
@f1
@w2
=

cw1

  1
1 
(1  )LMG

1 
2 T
 
1 
@f2
@w1
=

cw2

  1
1 
LMG

1 
1 T
 
1 
@f2
@w2
=

c

  1
1 
(w2)
 2+
1  B2 +

cw2

  1
1 
(1  )LMG

1 
2
where
B1 = L
Mw1G

1 
1 + (1  )LMw2G

1 
2 T
 
1  + LA1 p
AG

1 
1 + L
A
2 p
AG

1 
2 T
 
1  > 0
B2 = L
Mw1G

1 
1 T
 
1  + (1  )LMw2G

1 
2 + L
A
1 p
AG

1 
1 T
 
1  + LA2 p
AG

1 
2 > 0:
So,
j Dwf (w; ; )j = @f1
@w1
@f2
@w2
  @f1
@w2
@f2
@w1
=

c

  2
1 
(w1w2)
 2+
1  B1B2 +

c

  2
1 
(w1)
 2+
1  (w2)
 1
1  B1 (1  )LMG

1 
2
+

c

  2
1 
(w2)
 2+
1  (w1)
 1
1  B2L
MG

1 
1
+

c

  2
1 
(w1w2)
 1
1   (1  )  LM2G 1 1 G 1 2
 

c

  2
1 
(w1w2)
 1
1   (1  )  LM2G 1 1 G 1 2 T  21  :
The rst three terms are all positive, and the fourth and fth terms become
c

  2
1 
(w1w2)
 1
1   (1  )  LM2G 1 1 G 1 2 1  T  21  > 0:
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Since T > 1 and  2
1  < 0, we have T
 2
1  < 1 . Therefore, j Dwf (w; ; )j > 0.
This property holds for all values of endogenous variables, not just equilibrium
values.
Corollary 1. 8 2 , 8 2 (0; 1), equilibrium in commodity markets dened by
equations (9) and (10) exists and is unique.
The index condition implies a unique equilibrium for a system of excess demand
functions (see, for example, Mas-Colell, 1995; and Kehoe, 1998). It can easily be
veried that f satises the properties of excess demand functions such as: Walras
Law holds; f is bounded from below; and if there is a sequence of prices with a
component approaching zero, then the excess demand approaches innity.
Notice that since the Index Condition for our model relies on derivatives with
respect to endogenous variables, it is veried for the parameter space that is a product
of ours and transport cost T , for example.
3. Migration Dynamics
The free migration condition requires that at an interior equilibrium (0 <  <
1), skilled workers receive the same utility level in both regions. Various migration
dynamics can be added, in a consistent manner, on top of this migration equilibrium
condition. Given some parameters  2 , a C2 vector eld h (; ), h : (0; 1)! R
describes the dynamics of  after solving for w (; ):
_ = h (; ) :
The dynamics are consistent with the migration condition if the following properties
are satised for all (; ) 2 (0; 1):
(D1) If h (; ) = 0, then g (w (; ) ; ; ) = 0.
(D2) If Dg (w (; ) ; ; ) has full rank (equal to 1), then Dh (; ) has full rank
(equal to 1).
Condition D1 says that stationary points of h select from solutions to the migration
equilibrium condition g (w (; ) ; ; ) = 0. Moreover, condition D2 says that the
12
dynamics of h preserve the rank of the Jacobian matrix of g in the parameter space.
The function g is the di¤erence in indirect utility for the two regions. A stronger
condition on the derivatives, which is not needed in our analysis, would be: when an
exogenous change in parameters (keeping endogenous variables xed) makes utility
higher in a region, population wants to move there. Conditions D1 and D2 rule out
strange dynamics that alter the nature of the economy. Our genericity analysis in
fact applies to all C2 dynamics that satisfy conditions D1 and D2.
A common example of dynamics satisfying our assumptions is replicator dynamics
(Weibull, 1995; Fujita et al., 1999; and Baldwin et al., 2003).2 The population change
in a region is proportional to the di¤erence between the local utility level and the
average utility level:
h (; ) =  [v1 (; )  (v1 (; ) + (1  ) v2 (; ))] :
Denition 1. A dynamic equilibrium of an economy  2  is a population ratio
 2 (0; 1) such that h (; ) = 0.
Under D1, implicit in this denition is the fact that commodity markets clear,
since w (; ) is an argument of g.
Parameter Paths
The vector eld h (; ) for dynamics is dened over the whole parameter space .
Previous literature has examined dynamics when the transportation cost is changed,
keeping other parameters xed. This is a very special parameter path that fol-
lows along the transportation cost axis. The general case is when many parameters
change simultaneously, resulting in a one dimensional smooth path through the multi-
dimensional parameter space . Therefore, we proceed to examine the dynamics
along arbitrary parameter pathsin the parameter space.
A parameter path is a Cr map  : [0; 1] !  where r  2. In other words
 2 Cr([0; 1];), where we impose the standard Cr topology on this space of parame-
ter paths. The path  denes a one-parameter family of vector elds h (;  (t)), where
2The replicator dynamics satisfy conditions D1 and D2.
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t 2 [0; 1] is used to index the parameter path. LetE () = f(; t) 2 (0; 1) [0; 1] j h (;  (t)) = 0g
denote the set of dynamic equilibrium points.
Given this structure, we can dene bifurcations. An equilibrium locus from an
equilibrium point (; t) 2 E () is the image of a continuous map e : [0; 1]! (0; 1)
[0; 1] such that e (0) = (; t) and e (z) 2 E () for z 2 [0; 1]. The equilibrium locus
takes as its domain the unit interval purely for convenience. A parameter path  has
a bifurcation with crossing equilibrium loci at

^; t^

2 E () if for any neighborhood
around

^; t^

there are more than two distinct equilibrium loci from

^; t^

. This type
of bifurcation includes the tomahawk, the pitchfork, and the transcritical bifurcations.
Next, we claim that a necessary condition for having crossing equilibrium loci
at

^; t^

is that D(;t)h

^; 
 
t^

does not have full rank. It is easy to see this as
follows.
D(;t)h

^; 
 
t^

, a vector with two components, has full rank if and only if it is not
zero. Say Dth

^; 
 
t^

is nonzero. By the implicit function theorem, h (;  (t)) = 0
can be locally solved as a C1 function of . This means that E () is a C1 curve in a
neighborhood of

^; t^

. Therefore, in a small neighborhood, there can be only two dis-
tinct equilibrium loci from

^; t^

. An analogous argument applies if Dh

^; 
 
t^

is nonzero.
Therefore, if a path  has D(;t)h (;  (t)) with full rank at all of its equilibria
(namely where h (;  (t)) = 0), it does not have bifurcations with crossing equilib-
rium loci. The next proposition says that if the parameter space is chosen properly,
generically in all paths there is no such kind of bifurcation. More precisely, the set of
paths without such bifurcations is open and dense.
We say that parameter space b satises the rank condition for h if D(;)h (; )
has full rank whenever h (; ) = 0 (such parameter spaces are used in Debreu, 1970;
Dierker, 1974; and Mas-Colell, 1985). This condition is standard in the smooth
economies literature of general equilibrium theory, and is satised by an open set of
economies. In the language of that literature, it is called a regular parameterization.
Proposition 2. For any h satisfying D1 and D2, parameter space  satises the
rank condition for h.
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Note that parameter spaces with more exogenous variables but containing  as
a subspace also satisfy the rank condition. Thus, it is easy to nd such parameter
spaces as long as they contain a minimum set of parameters that have a full rank
Jacobian matrix with respect to endogenous variables and exogenous parameters at
equilibrium (see also Berliant and Zenou, 2002; and Berliant and Kung, 2006).
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the denition of F = (f1; f2; g) and  = (1; 2; ),
it is straightforward to calculate
DF (w; ; ) =
0BB@
  
c(1 ) 0 0
0   
c(1 ) 0
0 0 w1G
 
1
1CCA :
By the index condition and the Implicit Function Theorem,
Dw (; ) =  Df (w; ; ) [Dwf (w; ; )] 1:
Then,
Dg (w (; ) ; ; ) = Dw (; )Dwg (w; ; ) +Dg (w; ; )
=  Df (w; ; ) [Dwf (w; ; )] 1Dwg (w; ; ) +Dg (w; ; )
=  

Df1 (w; ; ) Df2 (w; ; )

[Dwf (w; ; )]
 1Dwg (w; ; ) +Dg (w; ; ) :
This expression is a linear combination of three vectors Df1, Df2 and Dg, that are
linearly independent whenever F (w; ; ) = 0 since DF has full rank. Thus, we can
conclude thatDg (w (; ) ; ; ) 6= 0 and has full rank whenever g (w (; ) ; ; ) = 0.
By conditions D1 and D2, we know thatDh (; ) has full rank whenever h (; ) = 0.
Note that D(;)h (; ) having full rank does not imply that D(;t)h (;  (t)) has
full rank, but rather implies a generic property of the parameter paths :
Proposition 3. For dynamics h satisfying D1, the set of parameter paths  that
do not have bifurcations with crossing equilibrium loci is open and dense for any open
parameter space b satisfying the rank condition for h, for example any b with  a
lower dimensional subspace of b.
15
We will use the following Theorem in the proof of Proposition 3. For a Cr map
 : A ! B between manifolds A and B, we say that b 2 B is a regular value of
 if Da (a) has full rank whenever  (a) = b. We cite the following theorem (see
Guillemin and Pollack, 1974, p. 68; and Mas-Colell, 1985, p. 320):
Transversality Theorem. Suppose that  : X  S ! <n is a Cr map where
X and S are Cr boundariless manifolds with r > max f0; dim (X)  ng, and let
s (x) = f (x; s), s : X ! <n. If c 2 <n is a regular value for , then except for s
in a set of measure zero in S, c is a regular value for s.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows closely the proof of Mas-Colell (1985, Proposi-
tion 8.8.2, p. 345).
Proof of Proposition 3. The set of paths  such that D(;t)h (;  (t)) has full
rank whenever h (;  (t)) = 0 is open because of continuity.3 To show that this set
is also dense, for any path , we construct a path 0 that is arbitrarily close to  and
does not have bifurcations with crossing equilibrium loci.
For any path , dene a map  : (0; 1) [0; 1]<3 ! <,
 (; t; a) = h (;  (t) + a)
where a 2 R3 and  (t) + a 2 b. Then, Da (; t; a) = Dh (; ); the latter has
full rank whenever  (; t; a) = h (;  (t) + a) = 0 (using the rank condition). By
the Transversality Theorem, D(;t) (; t; a) has full rank whenever  (; t; a) = 0 for
almost all a. So, we can pick any a0 with this property arbitrarily close to zero and
set 0 (t) =  (t) + a0. Therefore, D(;t)h (; 0 (t)) = D(;t) (; t; a0) has full rank
whenever h (; 0 (t)) =  (; t; a0) = 0. Then, 0 (t) is the path we want.
Evidently, Proposition 3 holds for any open parameter space b satisfying the rank
condition for h, including all b that contain  as a subspace. For example, b could
include all of the parameters in  but also the transport cost parameter T . It is
simply easier to exposit our analysis with fewer parameters.
3A simple proof by contradiction works well here.
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4. Conclusion
The study of bifurcations provides interesting insights into the complex dynamic
behavior of a system. It is important to study an economic system in a one dimen-
sional parameter space when the chosen parameter is the main force changing the
economy. In the case of the new economic geography, that parameter is transporta-
tion cost. However, the real world has many parameters, and the choice of parameters
a¤ects the equilibrium (bifurcation) diagram of a system. This raises the following
question: Given enough parameters, what kind of dynamic behavior is typical? We
characterize the generic pattern of dynamic regional systems along general smooth
paths of parameter change in a higher (for example, 3) dimensional parameter space.
We show that, in a parameter space satisfying the rank condition, there is a generic
(open and dense) set of parameter paths that do not have bifurcations with crossing
equilibrium loci. Thus, the use of such bifurcations, for example the tomahawk bi-
furcation, to generate core-periphery urban patterns from an initial uniform pattern
is suspect because it relies on the strategic choice4 of very specic parameter values
and paths of parameter change. This has led to an urban legend.
It is easy, but notationally burdensome, to extend our results to more general
models. For example, the two region framework can easily be replaced with n
regions. The arguments are basically unchanged.
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Figure 1: a = 0;  2 < b < 2:
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Figure 2: a = 0:005;  2 < b < 2:
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Figure 3: a =  0:005;  2 < b < 2:
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Figure 4:  1:2 < a < 1:2;  2 < b < 2:
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